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THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES UNDER SECTION 10(b)
AND RULE 10b-5
I. INTRODUCTION
The proper measure of damages for violations of the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws has developed with a large
degree of uncertainty, resulting in a multiplicity of formulations.'
Within the federal securities regulatory scheme created by the Se-
curities Act of 19332 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,3 sev-
eral provisions authorize private civil actions and specify a measure
of damages.4 Certain antifraud provisions,5 most significantly sec-
tion 10(b) of the 1934 Act,6 specify no precise measure of damages
and thus form the basis of a judicial search for an appropriate mea-
sure of damages to effectuate the antifraud remedies. The courts
have focused on section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, 7 and, accordingly,
this comment examines the measures of damages under these
provisions.
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and rule lOb-5, promulgated as
the statute's administrative counterpart by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC), prohibits the use of "any manipulative
1. See Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule lOb-5: A Restitution Alternative to
Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REV. 349, 350 (1984); see generally A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND
PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10B-5 § 260.03 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing various measures in
detail).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (1982) [hereinafter the 1933 Act].
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982) [hereinafter the 1934 Act].
4. Several examples include: § 11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982) (provid-
ing a restitutionary measure of damages for false registration statements); and § 12 of
the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982) (providing a rescissory and restitutionary measure
for false prospectus statements). Seegenerally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REM-
EDIES § 9.3 (1973) (discussing remedies under statutory regulation of securities
dealing).
5. Examples include: § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982) (covering
fraudulent interstate transactions); and § 18(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a)
(1982) (providing liability for false or misleading statements).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
7. See Recent Development, Damages for Insider Trading in the Open Market: A New
Limitation on Recovery Under Rule IOb-5, 34 VAND. L. REV. 797, 797-99 (1981). One com-
mentator has remarked: "The measure of damages in securities fraud actions brought
under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and its corollary, rule lOb-5,
... has long been a neglected stepchild of the securities laws." Mullaney, Theories of
Measuring Damages in Security Cases and the Effects of Damages on Liability, 46 FORDHAM L.
REV. 277, 277 (1977).
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or deceptive device" in the purchase or sale of securities.' Plaintiffs'
reliance on the broad language of rule lOb-5 has established the
rule as the general authority for private civil litigation under the se-
curities laws.9 While section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 fail to provide a
measure of damages, however, the Supreme Court held in Affiliated
Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States 1o that section 28(a) of the 1934
Act" provides the "correct measure of damages."12
Section 28(a) provides in pertinent part: "[N]o person permit-
ted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of [the Ex-
change Act] shall recover ... a total amount in excess of his actual
damages on account of the act complained of.' 3 Because section
28(a) fails to define the term "actual damages," though, this provi-
sion has only broadened the search for an appropriate measure of
damages under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.
Attempting to give effect to this provision, courts have promul-
gated a myriad of methods to determine damages on a case by-case
basis. 14 The measures of damages most often noted include an out-
of-pocket measure, a benefit-of-the-bargain measure, a "cover"
measure, 15 the Chasins measure, 16 and a rescissory and restitutionary
measure. An additional consideration arising in connection with the
measurement of damages is the recovery of consequential damages.
It has been argued, however, that all of these measures fail to ac-
8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986). Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or,
(c) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
A federal court first found an implied private cause of action under § 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
9. See, e.g., Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1361 n.l (8th Cir.
1977) (noting the "catchall" nature of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951
(1978); D. DOBBS, supra note 4, at § 9.3.
10. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982).
12. 406 U.S. at 155.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Garnatz, 559 F.2d at 1361 n. 1; Recent Development, supra note 7, at 799.
15. See infra Section II.B.
16. The Chasins measure refers to a remedy formulated in Chasins v. Smith, Barney
& Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1173 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'g 306 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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complish their objectives in open-market insider-trading cases.' 7
Another challenge to these measures rests on the case-by-case ap-
proach used by the courts, resulting in the blurring of rule lOb-5's
remedies and a failure by courts to articulate any guiding
principles.' s
This comment pursues several objectives. First, it outlines in
greater detail the measures of damages noted above. Next, it dis-
cusses the merits of these various measures in seeking awards for
damages under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Finally, the comment
concludes that in the context of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 the
multiplicity of damages formulas is not necessarily a problem and
may even be required by the complex issues raised.
II. MEASURES OF DAMAGES
A. Out-of-Pocket Damages
To give meaning to the term "actual damages" and to follow
the Supreme Court's lead in Affiliated Ute Citizens, 9 many courts have
adopted the out-of-pocket measure as the basic measure of damages
in rule lOb-5 actions.20
The Tenth Circuit has defined a plaintiff's recovery under the
out-of-pocket rule as "the difference between the contract price, or
the price paid, and the real or actual value at the date of sale.... .,"t
For example, if a defendant fraudulently induces a plaintiff to buy
stock for consideration worth $60 when the fair value of the stock
was only $40, then the plaintiff would recover $20 per share. The
converse is true when a seller is defrauded. Thus, a seller would
recover $20 per share if the stock with a fair value of $60 was sold
17. See Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule l0b-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded Securi-
ties, 26 STAN. L. REV. 371, 385 (1974).
18. Thompson, supra note 1, at 350-51.
19. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
20. See A. JACOBS, supra note 1, at 11-30; Mullaney, supra note 7, at 281.
21. Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303
F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962). In this case the plaintiff purchased 20,000 shares of
Studebaker-Packard common stock through Merrill Lynch. In subsequent litigation
over claims of breach of fiduciary duty by Merrill Lynch, the court held that the measure
of damages for fraud was the out-of-pocket rule. Unfortunately, the plaintiff failed to
show any loss under this measure and the court denied recovery. See also Nelson v.
Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978) (articulating




for consideration worth $40.22 Hence, the out-of-pocket measure
focuses on the plaintiff's actual loss rather than speculating on any
potential gain. Consequently, this measure bars the plaintiff's re-
covery of any disgorgement of the defendant's gain that may exceed
the plaintiff's loss. 2 3 Several questions arise in the application of
the out-of-pocket rule.
1. Timing of Valuation.-First, the out-of-pocket rule raises the
question of the proper time to determine fair value. One response,
set out in Myzel v. Fields,2 4 has been to determine the fair values of
the security and the consideration at the time of the fraudulent
transaction. Another court, in Richardson v. MacArthur,25 rejected
valuation on the date of the transaction and instead advocated valu-
ation on the date the fraud was discovered or should have been dis-
covered. A third view, adopted in Harris v. American Investment Co. ,26
values the security at a post-transaction date, to account for subse-
quent events such as the market reaction to the fraud.
The willingness of some courts to value the security at some
post-transaction time has been termed a "modified or hybrid out-of-
pocket measure of damages. '" 27 Valuation at this later date avoids
speculating as to the value of a fluctuating stock or security at an
earlier point in time. By waiting to value a security until the market
responds to the fraud, it is believed that a more accurate value may
be established. A different problem arises if a court attempts to
value stock of a closely held corporation that has no ready market.
One criticism leveled at determining value at some post-trans-
22. One commentator has framed the measure in two ways:
For a defrauded seller: The fair value of the security sold minus the fair value of the
consideration received, all measured at the time of the transaction.
For a defrauded buyer: The fair value of the consideration paid for the security minus
the fair value of the security bought, all measured at the time of the transaction.
A. JAcoBs, supra note 1, at 11-32.
23. By allowing the plaintiff to recover only what he or she has lost on the transac-
tion, the plaintiff cannot recover the illegal profits the defendant might have gained on a
subsequent transaction. For example, if the defendant had reaped a profit of $30 and
the out-of-pocket measure only awarded $20 to the plaintiff, the defendant is not re-
quired to "disgorge" the $10 excess. See infra Section D.5.
24. 386 F.2d 718, 745 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
25. 451 F.2d 35, 43 (10th Cir. 1971).
26. 523 F.2d 220, 226-27 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 1054 (1976). In Harris
the plaintiff failed to show the actual value of his securities at the time of the transaction.
On appeal the Eighth Circuit reversed the summary judgment granted the defendant
and allowed the plaintiff to show value on the date of the public discovery of the fraud.
In the court's view, the market adjustment for the fraud represented the true value of
the security.
27. See Thompson, supra note 1, at 361.
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action date argues that the later valuation may allow a plaintiff to
recover for injury not related to the fraudulent act. 28 The value on
the subsequent date may have been depressed by influences other
than the fraud, such as a general market decline.
In order to prevent a plaintiff from speculating on the market
value of the security and shifting the risk of a subsequent market
change to the defendant, valuation should be made on the date of
the fraudulent transaction. Valuation on the date of the transaction,
however, should not be used if a plaintiff can establish that at the
time of the transaction fraud so pervaded the market that this date
would not represent an accurate date for valuation. In such cases,
the courts should be willing to examine in a limited fashion subse-
quent market events that may provide a more accurate valuation of
the security.
2. Determination of Fair Value.-The out-of-pocket measure also
requires a court to select a method for determining fair value. Valu-
ation methods include market value, capitalization of corporate
earnings, and book or liquidation. 21
The use of market value to determine a security's value involves
the determination of the price of the security on a specific date when
the market is "true." The term "true" refers to a market that will
accurately reflect the price of the security. A similar rationale is em-
bodied in an efficient market theory. Under this theory, the natural
operation of the security markets is deemed to produce an accurate
price for a security. A market has been found not true when fraud
has influenced the market and the trading public does not have the
full truth for a sufficient period to allow the market to adjust.30 An
"untrue" market also exists when the people in the market are un-
willing buyers and sellers.3
The fluctuation of a security's value on any given date creates
an additional consideration in the use of market value, since a court
must select the precise value to be used on that date. 2 A court may
use the average price between the high and low prices of a security
on the date of valuation.33 Other corollary measures have been ap-
plied in different contexts. For example, the average of bid and
28. Id. at 362 (citing similar views).
29. Note, supra note 17, at 384.
30. See American General Ins. Co. v. Equitable General Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721,
761-63 (E.D. Va. 1981).
31. See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 136 (1972).
32. See generally A. JACOBS, supra note 1, at 11-212 to -215.
33. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 331 F. Supp. 671, 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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asked price is used for securities traded on NASDAQ. For securities
not traded on NASDAQ but on the over-the-counter markets, such
as the "pink sheets,"34 the high bid-low bid average is appropriate.
Another measure suggested for a security traded on several markets
is to use its value on its major market. In many cases, the relevant
market will be New York because of its dominance in the American
securities markets. Although the market value technique suggests
relative ease in application, a problem arises when attempting to
value securities of a closely held corporation that has no real market.
One acceptable method for affixing a value to a closely held
corporation's securities focuses on the corporation's earnings.
Under this method, a trier of fact must select a figure that reflects
the future earnings of the corporation and then use an appropriate
interest rate to capitalize or discount the earnings to present value.
It has been suggested that future earnings should be used instead of
past earnings that may be clouded by the fraud. 5 Other variations
of this method look to an earnings trend, relying on expert testi-
mony for the price/earnings ratio of comparable companies. A sim-
ilar technique uses the price of stock of companies with comparable
earnings potential.3 6 Unfortunately, a lack of an earnings history by
the corporation would substantially undermine the use of earnings
to value the security.
A third valuation technique looks to the value of a company's
assets. Specifically, this alternative rests on the corporation's net
value, i.e., assets minus liabilities. This measure is not wholly deter-
minative, as the "book value" of assets represents the historical cost
of the acquisition of the assets, 7 and therefore may not accurately
reflect the corporation's value. One commentator indicates that
book value would only be appropriate as a valuation method when a
corporation is in formation or in liquidation as in bankruptcy.3 8 An
additional difficulty with the asset valuation method arises if there is
an inability to appraise the assets accurately.
34. The term "pink sheets" refers to securities listed in sheets published by the Na-
tional Quotation Bureau where dealers place their bid and ask quotations. If the securi-
ties meet certain standards, they are then listed on NASDAQ. A. JACOBS, supra note 1, at
9-143.
35. Note, supra note 17, at 384.
36. See Gottlieb v. Sandia Am. Corp., 304 F. Supp. 980, 992 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd in
part, rev 'd in part, 452 F.2d 510 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Wechsler v. Gottlieb, 404
U.S. 938 (1971).
37. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 165 (5th ed. 1979).
38. Note, Measurement of Damages in Private Actions Under Rule lOb-5, 1968 WASH.
U.L.Q. 165, 174 n.47 (1968).
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Having reviewed these several techniques for valuation, the
market value method emerges as the most practical solution, at least
for publicly traded companies. The information concerning market
value is easily obtainable and presents a relatively simple basis on
which a factfinder may make a decision. With respect to closely held
companies, an earnings valuation technique may offer the most eq-
uitable valuation of the corporation's security.
3. Consequences of the Out-of-Pocket Measure.-Several conse-
quences flow from an application of the out-of-pocket measure of
damages. Reliance on this measure of damages can directly affect
whether the plaintiff can: 1) maintain the action; 2) use this measure
in an insider-trading case; and 3) pursue a benefit-of-the-bargain
measure of damages. An additional consideration in pursuing any
measure of damages is the recovery of consequential damages.
First, if a plaintiff elects to pursue damages as measured by the
out-of-pocket measure, the plaintiff must establish that a difference
existed between the price paid for the security and its actual worth.
Failure to establish this difference results in the dismissal of the
plaintiff's suit. 39 Consequently, the plaintiff's priority at the trial,
aside from establishing liability, should be to establish the value of
the security through reference to its market value on the date of the
fraudulent transaction.
One difficulty arising from this measure of recovery in rule 1 Ob-
5 actions is the difficulty in applying it to open-market insider-trad-
ing situations. Because no privity exists between buyers and sellers,
it is difficult to determine the values of the consideration paid and
the securities received at the specific time of a transaction. Further-
more, due to the large number of buyers and sellers involved in
these transactions, the potential exists for crippling damage awards.
As a result, courts have modified the traditional measure to fit this
unique situation.
An example of a judicially created modification of this measure
is found in Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc.4 In 1971 Liggett & Myers
(Liggett) experienced a successful year. Market forecasters pre-
dicted an equally good year in 1972, and Liggett generally con-
curred in this assessment.4 ' In 1972 the Liggett directors received
indications that the company would suffer a decline, and they de-
39. See generally A. JACOBS, supra note 1, at 11-36 (citing cases); Mullaney, supra note
7, at 281 (same).
40. 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
41. Id. at 160.
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cided to release this information to the press. Prior to the public
statement, two insiders tipped some financial analysts about the an-
nouncement. These tips led to the sale of some Liggett stock.
Upon discovery of the fraudulent conduct, a class of plaintiffs sued
for violation of section 10(b) and rule l0b-5.
The trial court found violations of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5
and consequently held the defendants liable to all purchasers who
bought in the period from the first tip to the date of public disclo-
sure, roughly a period of six days. This measure, tied to the lowest
value that the Liggett stock reached, resulted in a total recovery of
approximately $740,000.42
On appeal the Second Circuit noted that the lower court had
determined damages based upon a measure used for face-to-face
transactions. The Court of Appeals then found that in this case the
element of inducement by fraud4 3 was lacking from the transac-
tions.4 4 Rejecting the lower court's measure and noting the poten-
tial for exorbitant damages, the court adopted a measure in
accordance with the proposed Federal Securities Code.4 5 Specifi-
cally, the court structured its remedy:
(1) to allow any uninformed investor, where a reasonable
investor would either have delayed his purchase or not
purchased at all if he had the benefit of tipped information,
to recover any post-purchase decline in market value of his
shares up to a reasonable time after he learns of the tipped
information or after a public disclosure of it but limit his
recovery to the amount gained by the tippee as a result of
his selling at the earlier date rather than delaying his sale
until the parties could trade on an equal informational
basis.46
By adopting this measure in the open-market insider-trading con-
text, the Elkind court attempted to deter fraud by depriving insiders
42. 472 F. Supp. 123, 134-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
43. Insider trading cases are no longer determined under the standards applied by
the Elkind court, but rather are now determined under the standards set out in Dirks v.
SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). The test is whether the insider personally will benefit, di-
rectly or indirectly, from the disclosure. Absent some personal gain, the courts will find
no breach of duty to shareholders, and absent any breach by the insider, there is no
derivative breach by the tippee. Id. at 662.
44. 635 F.2d at 168-69.
45. See ALI FED. SEC. CODE §§ 1603, 1703(b), 1711(1) (draft 1978).
46. 635 F.2d at 172. The court hypothesized that if a tippee sold 5,000 shares at $50
per share and the security dropped to $40 within a reasonable time after disclosure, the




of their gain while at the same time preventing crippling damage
awards. While it acknowledged some difficulties with this mea-
sure, 4 7 the court nevertheless decided that the disgorgement mea-
sure represented the most equitable solution.
The disgorgement measure, however, suffers a theoretical
drawback. By merely requiring defendants to disgorge illegally ob-
tained profits, defendants incur no real penalty but rather return to
their previous financial position. This result could encourage de-
fendants to continue similar illegal conduct in the future. Conse-
quently, Congress enacted the Insider Trading Sanctions Act,4 8
which provides for the award of treble damages. 49
4. The Benefit-of-the-Bargain Measure.-The benefit-of-the-bar-
gain measure of damages differs from the out-of-pocket measure by
focusing on the plaintiff's potential gain had the misrepresentation
been true. As noted earlier, the out-of-pocket measure focuses on
the plaintiff's actual loss. For example, if a defrauded shareholder
in a tender offer sold stock that was represented to be worth $50
and that shareholder subsequently received $40 when the stock's ac-
tual value was $45, the benefit-of-the-bargain measure would award
plaintiff $10 per share ($50 minus $40). On the other hand, the out-
of-pocket measure would have awarded plaintiff $5 per share ($45
minus $40), based upon the actual value of the security.
Generally, the federal courts have rejected the benefit-of-the-
bargain measure, due to statutory interpretation, history, and policy
considerations." First, it is argued that the "actual damages" lan-
guage of section 28(a) of the 1934 Act does not encompass the ben-
efit-of-the-bargain measure because this measure arguably awards a
plaintiff more than was actually lost. Next, commentators note that
the federal courts' preference for the out-of-the-pocket measure
over the benefit-of-the-bargain measure stems from the pre-Erie51
federal common law of damages. Finally, it has been asserted that
the federal courts may object to tying the measure of damages to an
47. Difficulties with this measure include the duplication of the SEC's disgorgement
proceeding and the potential for slightly larger recoveries if the market was depressed
due to influences other than the fraud. Id. at 172-73.
48. Insider Trader Sanctions Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (Supp. III 1985). See gener-
ally Langevoort, Commentay-The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and Its Effect on Ex-
isting Law, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1273 (1984).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1985).
50. See Thompson, supra note 1, at 359-60.
51. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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arbitrary representation of a security's value that is highly
speculative.
Many states, however, have adopted the benefit-of-the-bargain
measure in tort actions for deceit. This measure thus takes on im-
portance if a plaintiff attempts to sue in federal court alleging both
federal and state claims. Moreover, the Second Circuit adopted the
benefit-of-the-bargain measure in the limited context of Osofsky v.
Zipf. 5 2
In Osofsky defrauded shareholders of a target corporation in a
successful merger sued under the 1934 Act, claiming that they were
fraudulently induced to relinquish control of their company because
of misrepresentations in the tender offer and the proxy solicitation
materials.53 The trial court granted summary judgment for the de-
fendants on the ground that the plaintiffs suffered no out-of-pocket
loss and, therefore, had no "actual damages" under the 1934 Act.5 4
On appeal the Second Circuit reversed the lower court's deci-
sion and held:
We believe that the benefit-of-the-bargain rule should be
applied under the 1934 Act to the limited situation in-
volved in this case, where misrepresentation is made in the
tender offer and proxy solicitation materials as to the con-
sideration to be forthcoming upon an intended merger.
But, of course, giving the plaintiff benefit-of-the-bargain
damages is appropriate only when they can be established
with reasonable certainty.55
In reaching this result, the court first noted that the "purpose of
Section 28(a) is to compensate civil plaintiffs for economic loss suf-
fered as a result of wrongs committed in violation of the 1934
Act." 56 Based on this objective, the court refused to construe sec-
tion 28(a) "to restrict the forms of nonspeculative, compensatory
damages available to defrauded parties." '57 Next, the Osofsky court
distinguished the cases often cited in support of the pre-Erie rejec-
tion of the benefit-of-the-bargain measure58 by noting that the rep-
resentations in those cases were highly speculative.59 In contrast,
52. 645 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1981).
53. Id. at 109-11.
54. Id. at 110.
55. Id. at 114.
56. Id. at I11.
57. Id.
58. See Sigafus v. Porter, 179 U.S. 116 (1900); Smith v. Bolles, 132 U.S. 125 (1889).
59. 645 F.2d at 112.
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the plaintiffs' damages in Osofsky could be determined with certainty
as the sellers did not receive the price for which they had bar-
gained.6" Having addressed the three common obstacles mounted
against the benefit-of-the-bargain measure, the Osofsky court
adopted the benefit-of-the-bargain measure of damages in this spe-
cial situation.
5. Consequential Damages.-Consequential damages represent
costs incurred by the plaintiff that are attributable to the defendant's
wrongful conduct.6 ' These damages play a key role in a plaintiff's
recovery as they compensate the plaintiff for various expenses
caused by the fraud. A plaintiff may seek consequential damages in
conjunction with general, rescissory, and restitutionary damages.
Further, consequential damages are available even if the plaintiff
fails to prove a loss under a general measure of damages.
Courts have awarded consequential damages in a wide variety
of forms. For example, in Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman 62 the plaintiffs
were allowed to seek consequential damages incurred in attempting
to save an insurance company that they had purchased. Case law
establishes that consequential damages may also include such items
as: dividends on stock that the plaintiff was fraudulently induced to
sell;6" dividends on stock the plaintiff would have bought that were
instead taken by defendants;' capital gains tax;6 5 brokerage fees
paid in connection with the fraudulent transaction; 66 and the plain-
tiff's expenses incurred with the purchase on the market of shares
the plaintiff was fraudulently induced to sell.6 7 Although conse-
60. Id. at 114.
61. Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196, 1212 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 920
(1983).
62. 498 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1974). To recover consequential damages, the plaintiff
must show the causal relationship between the expenditures and the fraud with a great
amount of certainty. Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973). Further, a court has included in consequential damages a loss
due to a market decline when it was shown that the plaintiff's decision to enter the
market was a "natural, proximate, and foreseeable consequence of defendant's fraud."
Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1361 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 95 (1978) (holding that the plaintiff's aversion to risk would have prevented partici-
pation in a risky investment program).
63. Glick v. Campagna, 613 F.2d 31, 36 (3d Cir. 1979).
64. Arrington v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 651 F.2d 615, 621 (9th
Cir. 1981).
65. Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 851 (E.D. Va. 1968).
66. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1039 (1978).
67. Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F. Supp. 128, 148 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970).
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quential damages encompass many items, courts do deny recovery
of some expenses incident to the fraud. For example, a New York
court has denied as consequential damages expenses incurred with
an SEC enforcement suit, the cost of an audit committee, and the
loss of income flowing from improper payments. 68
Despite the wide availability of consequential damages, courts
generally impose two restrictions on the award of consequential
damages. First, a claimant must establish that the expenses were the
proximate result of the fraud. Second, a court will deny conse-
quential damages if they duplicate the plaintiff's recovery from
some other measure of damages. Generally, the award of conse-
quential damages in connection with the use of the out-of-pocket
measure or restitution will not result in duplication of damages.69
B. The Cover Measure
The "cover" 7 measure of damages allows a defrauded seller to
recover the difference between the highest value a security achieves
within a reasonable period after the plaintiff discovers or should
have discovered the fraud and the value of the consideration at the
time of the transaction. For example, if a defrauded seller sold
stock worth $60 for $40 and the stock reached a value of $80 within
a reasonable time after discovery, the seller could recover $40 ($80
minus $40) per share. The cover measure theorizes that disclosure
of the fraud would have allowed the plaintiff to reduce the damages.
Thus, disclosure may have permitted the plaintiff to repurchase the
stock before it reached its maximum market value. Alternatively,
the plaintiff may have waited to sell the stock at a higher price.7 '
1. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur.-The leading case addressing
this measure of damages is Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 72 In
Mitchell defendant Texas Gulf Sulphur, which had made a valuable
ore discovery, released a press statement denying rumors of the
find. Later, the company made a second statement acknowledging
the discovery. Unfortunately for Mitchell and others, investors sold
68. Herman v. Beretta, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,685, at
98,595 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 1980).
69. D. DOBBS, supra note 4, at § 9.3.
70. The term "cover" derives from the measure of damages for conversion. See Mul-
laney, supra note 7, at 285. One commentator notes that the conversion analogy is "less
than perfect" because with over-the-counter and listed securities, the defendant never
gains control of the securities. A. JAcoBs, supra note 1, at 11-39.
71. Recent Development, supra note 7, at 805.
72. 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
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their stock in reliance upon the first press release. The Tenth Cir-
cuit stated:
We believe the measure of damages used should
award the reasonable investor the amount it would have
taken him to invest in the TGS market within a reasonable
period of time after he became informed of the [corrective]
April 16 release.., and its import to investment, a reason-
able time lapse may be allowed to expire to permit the in-
vestor to decide whether or not he would reinvest and take
advantage of a spiraling market .... The award proposed
would permit one to 'cover' by reinvestment and suffer
neither loss nor forced sale.
The damages then should be based on the highest
value of TGS stock between Monday April 20 and a reason-
able time thereafter.7 3
The court opted for the cover remedy as opposed to rescission
for two reasons. First, rescission would have been improper be-
cause there were no direct dealings and no privity between the par-
ties. Consequently, there was no contract to be rescinded and the
parties could not be returned to the status quo ante. Second, there
was no unjust enrichment accruing to the defendants that could be
awarded to the plaintiffs. The actual application of the cover mea-
sure raises several other issues.
2. Timing of Valuation.-When applying the cover measure, a
court must first establish the time for determining the value of both
the consideration and the security. In most cases the court will de-
termine the value of the consideration as of the date of the fraudu-
lent sale. As noted in the context of the out-of-pocket measure,
valuation on this date prevents unfair plaintiff speculation on a sub-
sequent market change, a concern that runs throughout all the dam-
age measures discussed in connection with rule lOb-5. Proposed
dates of valuing the security, however, have varied considerably.
The various times suggested include: the date of the violation; a
reasonable time after discovery of the fraud; the date of suit; and the
date of judgment."4
73. Id. at 105.
74. See Nye v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 588 F.2d 1189, 1198-1200 (8th Cir.
1978) (reasonable time after plaintiff's discovery); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. 478
F.2d 1281, 1306 n.27 (2d Cir. 1973) (reasonable time after breach); Baumel v. Rosen,
283 F. Supp. 128, 146-47 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd in part, rev"d in part, 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970) (date of fraudulent conduct); see generally A.
JACOBS, supra note 1, at 11-40-41.
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In considering these various dates, valuation on the date of the
fraudulent transaction presents several advantages. First, valuation
on this date minimizes any opportunity for plaintiff speculation.
Second, this rule offers relative ease in application, since a factfinder
may look to a specific date and compare the price at which the plain-
tiff sold the stock with the highest market price that the stock
reached on this date. Consequently, courts should measure the
value of both the security and the consideration on the date of the
fraudulent transaction to determine the plaintiff's recovery under
the cover measure of damages.
3. Additional Considerations.-Other issues arise in connection
with the operation of the cover measure of damages, including: the
facts that the plaintiff must discover; the timing of the discovery of
the fraud; and the meaning of a reasonable time. These concerns
resemble considerations often discussed in a contract action in con-
junction with a due diligence requirement or an obligation to miti-
gate damages. In a contract damages situation a plaintiff must
undertake action to either bring suit promptly or prevent an in-
crease in the injuries sustained by the breach. This policy reflects a
judicial concern for avoiding the imposition of an award that is not
commensurate with the injury caused by the defendant. A similar
concern is reflected in the courts' approach to awarding damages
under the cover measure. Generally, the timing and the facts neces-
sary to determine when the seller discovered or should have discov-
ered the fraud should correspond with those that would commence
the running of the statute of limitations.75 A reasonable time has
been found to range from one day to two months, 76 but the courts
can formulate no hard and fast rule as to a reasonable time, since
the time needed by different investors to reach a reinvestment deci-
sion will vary.
Criticism of the cover measure centers upon the perceived sim-
plistic treatment of the investor population in Mitchell v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur. Specifically, it has been argued that courts should not use
an objective approach, looking to the investment decision of a rea-
sonable investor77 as is suggested by the language of Mitchell.78 In-
stead, courts have been urged to use a more subjective approach
75. A. JACOBS, supra note 1, at 11-43.
76. See Nye, 588 F.2d at 1198 (two months); Baumel, 412 F.2d at 576 (one day); see
generally A. JACOBS, supra note 1, at 11-43 (citing additional cases).
77. A. JAcoBs, supra note 1, at 11-45.
78. 446 F.2d 90, 105 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
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tailored to the investors involved.79 Arguably, by considering each
investor subjectively, a court may more accurately affix a value to the
security.8 °
Thus, the cover measure can only be invoked by a defrauded
seller to recover the difference between the consideration paid and
the highest value reached by the security within a reasonable time
after the transaction. In addition, the defrauded seller may invoke
the measure despite an inability to prove an out-of-pocket loss. The
measure may also be invoked if the seller has not "covered" or finds
it impossible to cover the loss.
8 1
C. The Chasins Measure
The converse of the cover measure is the Chasins measure,
which provides a measure of damages for a defrauded buyer. De-
rived from Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co. ,82 this measure awards a
defrauded plaintiff the value of the consideration paid minus the
lowest value the security reaches within a reasonable time after the
fraud is discovered or should have been discovered."3 For example,
if the plaintiff bought stock at $45 when its value was $40 and then
sold the stock at $35 within a reasonable time, the Chasins measure
would award the plaintiff $10 per share ($45 minus $35). The Cha-
sins measure also differs from the out-of-pocket measure, which
would award the plaintiff $5 per share under these facts ($45 minus
$40).
In Chasins Smith, Barney failed to reveal to Chasins that it was
"making a market ' 8 4 in securities that it induced Chasins to
purchase. Justifying its award, the court stated: "Such a measure-
ment is justified where, as here, the evil is not the price at which
79. See Note, supra note 17, at 379 (dividing investors into two categories: long-term
investors and short-term investors); accord A. JACOBS, supra note 1, at 11-45 (enumerat-
ing factors: the seller's sophistication; the type of fraud; the market conditions; the
plaintiff's contacts with a broker; the market reaction time; and the size of plaintiff's
investment).
80. Id.
81. A plaintiff may not be able to cover, for example, when he or she has sold a block
of stock so large that it would be impossible or impracticable to reinvest.
82. 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'g 306 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
83. Various times for valuation of the security have been suggested besides the date
of the plaintiff's discovery of the fraud or the date when the plaintiff should have discov-
ered it. Other times include: the date suit was initiated; during trial; and the end of a
reasonable time. See A. JAcoBs, supra note 1, at 11-54.
84. "Making a market" has been defined by SEC rule 17-a9(f)(l), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.17a-9(f) (1986), as involving "a dealer who, with respect to a particular security,
holds himself out as being willing to buy and sell for his own account on a continuous
basis otherwise than on a national securities exchange."
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Chasins bought but the fact of being induced to buy and invest for
some future growth in these stocks without disclosure of Smith, Bar-
ney's interest; the damages granted were proper under the
circumstances."85
1. Application of the Chasins Measure.-As with the cover mea-
sure, the Chasins measure raises questions concerning the degree
and timing of a plaintiff's knowledge of the fraud, and the limits of
"a reasonable time."'8 6 With respect to the extent of a plaintiff's
discovery of the fraud and its timing, knowledge sufficient to com-
mence the running of the statute of limitations has been a suggested
standard. 87 As to the definition of a reasonable time, a court will
make this determination on a case-by-case basis.
2. Criticisms of the Chasms Measure.-Certain criticisms have
been leveled at the Chasins measure of damages. One commentator
stresses the "unworkability of exploring the subjective determina-
tions of the plaintiff investor.' '88 Another view suggests that "Cha-
sins should not be read as establishing a form of investor's insurance
for those persons who purchase in reliance on a misstatement or as
a result of a material omission. '"89
Thus, the Chasins measure of damages applies only to a de-
frauded buyer. A plaintiff may seek damages under this measure:
when the plaintiff's injury does not stem directly from the price
paid; when there is no evidence of the security's fair value and the
out-of-pocket measure is, therefore, inappropriate; or, when a bro-
ker-dealer violates rule lOb-5.9 °
D. Rescission, Restitution, and Windfall Profits9'
Instead of awarding some measure of damages at law to a de-
85. 438 F.2d at 1173.
86. See generally A. JACOBS, supra note 1, at 11-54 to -55 (discussing the same issues
raised under the cover measure of damages in the context of the Chasins measure).
87. A. JACOBS, supra note 1, at 11-43.
88. Note, supra note 17, at 376. Specifically, that commentator addresses the diffi-
culty of determining when a single investor would act in a market-trading situation in
which there are potentially hundreds of investors. The argument raises the issue of the
availability of this measure in class actions attacking insider-tippee trading.
89. Cobine, Elements of Liability and Actual Damages in Rule lOb-5 Actions, 1972 U. ILL.
L.F. 651, 673 (1972). Instead, this commentator argues that Chasins must be limited to
the broker-client relationship.
90. A. JACOBS, supra note 1, at 11-56 to -57.
91. First, rescission voids the contract. American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Equitable Gen.
Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721, 756 n.62 (E.D. Va. 1980). Specific restitution refers to the
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frauded plaintiff, courts may fashion an equitable form of relief by
allowing a plaintiff to rescind the transaction and seek specific resti-
tution. If specific restitution is impracticable or impossible, a court
may grant the plaintiff rescissory damages. Further, in some in-
stances, courts have used unjust enrichment principles to award the
plaintiff the gains that the defendant derived from the fraudulent
conduct.
1. Rescission.-In granting a rescissory remedy a court at-
tempts to return the plaintiff and the defendant to the status quo
ante.9 2 The availability of rescission in rule lOb-5 actions derives
from several sources. First, section 29(b) of the 1934 Act,9 3 which
renders any contract in violation of the Act voidable, provides one
theoretical basis.94 Further, if a plaintiff can establish a violation of
rule lOb-5, or any violation of the 1934 Act, section 29(b) protects
the interests of an innocent party to a fraudulent transaction based
on a contract and in violation of the 1934 Act.95 Specifically, instead
of being void, as the statutory language might suggest, the contract
is voidable at the election of the injured party, thereby preserving a
plaintiff's right to rescind.9 6 As a result, while scant attention has
been directed towards this provision, section 29(b) represents a
powerful tool for the protection of defrauded investors.97
Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act also expressly provides for rescis-
sion.9 8 This section allows a buyer to sue for rescission when the
offeror or seller of the security has included any untrue statement in
any prospectus or oral communication made to the buyer through
any means or instrument of interstate commerce or the mails. The
use of a rescissory remedy, therefore, is well established in securities
litigation.
Another basis for the right of rescission derives from the courts'
defendant's return to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff's similar return to the defendant, of
the property received in the transaction. Recovery of rescissory damages occurs when a
defendant is unable to accomplish specific restitution.
92. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 554 (5th Cir. 1981), modifiedon
other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1982).
94. See generally A. JACOBS, supra note 1, at 11-64 (arguing that the "actual damages"
language of § 28(a) includes rescission and restitution).
95. See Gruenbaum & Steinberg, Section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A
Viable Remedy Awakened, 48 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1979).
96. Id. at 8.
97. See id. at 3-4.
98. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982).
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ability to fashion appropriate equitable remedies.99 Some uncer-
tainty exists, however, as to whether a plaintiff can obtain rescission
when an adequate remedy exists under a measure of damages at
law.'0° Moreover, a rescissory remedy permits a plaintiff to shift the
risk of a declining market to the defendant and thereby reap a bene-
fit beyond the extent of the fraud. This has encouraged courts to
impose several constraints upon this remedy.' 0 '
The most basic requirement imposed on a plaintiff seeking re-
scission is that there must be a contractual relationship'0 2 with a de-
fendant."0 3 The privity requirement, therefore, renders rescission
unavailable in cases involving insider trading on the exchanges or in
the over-the-counter markets.
To discourage plaintiffs from shifting the risk of a market de-
cline to the defendant, courts require a plaintiff to file suit for rescis-
sion promptly after notice of the fraud. Baumel v. Rosen 104 offers a
classic example. In Baumel the plaintiffs sold their shares in a closely
held company to several insiders. These plaintiffs subsequently wit-
nessed the public sale of their former company for a significant
profit to the defendants. The plaintiffs, however, waited three years
to bring their suit for rescission. On appeal the Fourth Circuit de-
nied the claim for rescission because of the protracted delay be-
tween the discovery of the fraud and the suit.' 0 5 Baumel, therefore,
illustrates the two major constraints placed on the remedy of rescis-
sion: the existence of a contract and a prompt suit. Again, these
considerations are analogous to the requirements of due diligence
99. One court has noted: "'The cases are uniform in stating that one remedy which
may be available to a defrauded plaintiff under rule lOb-5 is to seek rescission of the
transaction .... ' " Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 554 (5th Cir.
1981) (quoting R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 1085 (4th ed. 1977)), modified on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983). Additional sup-
port is drawn from the Supreme Court's approval of rescission and restitution in
Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972) (citing with
approval cases supporting this remedy).
100. See Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F. Supp. 128, 146 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'din
part, 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970).
101. The plaintiff reaps a benefit by waiting to see whether the market will rise or fall
before selecting a remedy. If the market falls, the plaintiff will rescind and return a de-
preciated security and receive in return the plaintiff's undepreciated consideration that
the buyer used to purchase the security. See Thompson, supra note 1, at 369.
102. A contract is not necessarily required in the § 12(2) context in which the basic
requirement is the use of an untrue statement in a prospectus or oral communication.
103. Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 554: "Use of the rescissional measure is usually limited to
cases involving either privity between plaintiff and defendant or some specific fiduciary
duty owed by brokers to their customers."
104. 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970).
105. Id. at 574-75.
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and mitigation of damages. In many cases, rescission fails to pro-
vide adequate relief and it becomes necessary to consider restitution
as well.
2. Restitution.-Restitution differs from monetary damages and
rescission in a number of ways. First, the measure of restitution is
the amount by which the defendant was unjustly enriched.' 0 6 Thus,
restitution and damages rest on two different premises. While resti-
tution focuses on the defendant's gain, damages focus on compen-
sating the plaintiff for any loss. In addition, restitution differs from
rescission by not imposing a privity requirement.
These distinctions may suggest that restitution does not consti-
tute "actual damages" as required by section 28(a) of the 1934
Act; 10 7 this argument fails, however, in light of the Supreme Court's
approval of a restitutionary recovery in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v.
United States.11 8 Specifically, the Court cited with approvalJanigan v.
Taylor,'0 9 which required a defendant to return all the profits he had
gained on a subsequent resale of the stock. The Supreme Court's
apparent approval of this measure indicated that such a large recov-
ery not normally associated with the term "actual damages" was an
appropriate measure under rule lOb-5.
Several consequences flow from an election of specific restitu-
tion." l' First, the security's value does not need to be determined,
because specific restitution results in an exchange of the security for
the purchase price. Plaintiffs will only pursue specific restitution
when the value of what they gave up in the transaction exceeds the
value of what they received. Further, specific restitution may be had
even if the defendant no longer possesses the shares obtained from
the plaintiff. The defendant effectuates specific restitution in this
situation by tendering equivalent shares or purchasing shares to re-
turn to the plaintiff. Specific restitution represents only one form of
restitution. When the defendant cannot effect specific restitution,
the plaintiff may seek rescissory damages.
3. Rescissory Damages.-To accomplish the same goal as specific
restitution, rescissory damages equal the value that the plaintiff gave
106. Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir.) ("the recent trend looks to
defendant's profits rather than to plaintiff's losses in measuring damages"), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 970 (1978).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982).
108. 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972).
109. 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
110. See generally A. JACOBS, supra note 1, at 11-75 (discussing specific restitution).
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up minus the value received in the transaction."' Due to the poten-
tial for plaintiff speculation, the plaintiff must assert the claim
promptly. In addition, a court may mitigate any substantial harsh-
ness to the defendant resulting from this remedy by reducing the
plaintiff's recovery to reflect the amount by which defendant's ef-
forts increased the value of the security.' 12 A somewhat different
issue has arisen in deciding whether a defendant can offset the
amount to be tendered to the plaintiff in a rescission action by the
tax benefits the plaintiff receives from the investment.
4. Randall v. Loftsgaarden.-In its only securities decision in
1986, the Supreme Court answered the foregoing question. In Ran-
dall v. Loftsgaarden 1 " plaintiffs purchased limited partnership inter-
ests in a motel project marketed as a "tax shelter.""' When the
venture experienced financial difficulty, the plaintiffs brought suit
under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act" 5 for prospectus fraud and sec-
tion 10(b) of the 1934 Act for material misrepresentations made by
Loftsgaarden concerning the project's financing, leasing arrange-
ments, and compensation structure." 16 The Eighth Circuit had sus-
tained Loftsgaarden's liability under section 12(2) and section
10(b), and had ordered the award of rescissory damages reduced by
the tax benefits received by the plaintiffs.' ' 7 Due to a conflict in the
circuits over the issue," t8 the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
In resolving this question, the Court first held that the language
of section 12(2), requiring an offset for "income received," could
not include tax benefits. The Court reasoned that the statute's plain
meaning did not include tax benefits within the term "income." '"19
Further, the Court noted that the legislative history of section 12(2)
failed to establish any congressional intent to treat tax benefits as
111. See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 742 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968). Cf. Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act, [15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (Supp. III 1985)] (provid-
ing for rescissory damages if restitution is unavailable).
112. See Thompson, supra note 1, at 372 (noting the difficulty in procuring this protec-
tion for a defendant).
113. 106 S. Ct. 3143 (1986), aff'g Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168 (8th Cir.
1982).
114. The attraction of this investment was the ability of each individual limited part-
ner to claim deductible partnership losses greatly in excess of the funds invested. These
losses would then be used to offset other income.
115. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982).
116. 106 S. Ct. at 3147.
117. Austin, 675 F.2d at 181.
118. See Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826, 838 (9th Cir. 1984) (refusing to
reduce damages by tax benefits received).
119. 106 S. Ct. at 3150.
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"income received." In the context of rescission, Justice O'Connor,
writing for the majority, construed the term "consideration" to in-
clude only the money or property given by the investor.
1 2 1
Next, Justice O'Connor considered whether section 28(a) af-
fected the Court's conclusion that rescissory damages should not be
offset by tax benefits.' 2 ' First, the Court refused to limit section
12(2)'s rescissory remedy by a restrictive reading of section 28(a)'s
"actual damages" requirement. With respect to plaintiffs' section
10(b) claim, the Court again rejected a restrictive reading of section
28(a) that would limit the plaintiffs' recovery to their net economic
harm. The Court reasoned that any beneficial position in which the
plaintiffs find themselves derives more from operation of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code than from an unduly generous award of rescis-
sory damages. Consistent with these principles, the Court noted
that plaintiffs in the future would not be able to speculate by delay-
ing their suit and continuing to reap their tax benefits.1 22
In a brief partial concurrence, Justice Blackmun agreed with the
Court's conclusion as to section 12(2) but asserted that tax benefits
should be taken into account in rule lOb-5 actions for out-of-pocket
damages. 123 Justice Blackmun argued that tax benefits represent
part of the value that the plaintiffs bargained for in such a tax shelter
limited partnership. Consequently, if a rule lOb-5 violation occurred
with respect to these tax benefits, then the value of the tax benefits
should affect the determination of damages under an out-of-pocket
measure. 1
24
Finally, Justice Brennan in dissent argued that tax benefits
should be taken into account in section 12(2) rescissory awards.12 5
Justice Brennan based his argument on common law and equitable
principles relating to rescission, and concluded that the bargained-
for tax benefits are part of what the investors receive for their con-
sideration. For this reason, an amount representing these benefits
should offset what the defendant must return to the plaintiff in re-
scission. Using a broad construction of the term "income," Justice
Brennan concluded that the plaintiffs' award should be offset by the
tax benefits received in both section 12(2) and section 10(b)
120. Id. at 3151.
121. Id. at 3152.
122. Id. at 3155 (citing Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571, 574-75 (4th Cir. 1969)).
123. Id. at 3155-57 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 3156.




Justice Brennan's dissent raises several interesting points. First,
the Court's strong reliance on an Internal Revenue Code definition
of income does not commend itself as strongly as the Court sug-
gests. There are many definitions of income, some narrower than
others. Further, the Internal Revenue Service does not consider its
basic definition of income, found in section 61 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code, to be exhaustive. Justice Brennan's broader definition of
income, therefore, may be more relevant, since real estate limited
partnerships and their attendant tax benefits have achieved a degree
of prominence that did not exist when the securities laws were en-
acted. Justice Brennan's reliance on common law and equitable
principles of rescission in the absence of any express statutory com-
mand suggests a sound basis for the conclusion that tax benefits
should offset rescissory awards under rule 10b-5. To return the par-
ties truly to the status quo ante, each party must return the bargained-
for consideration, which includes the tax benefits accompanying a
limited partnership real estate investment. While such a course
might create administrative difficulties in calculating each investor's
tax benefits, this course more accurately reflects the principles of
rescission. Finally, allowing recovery of these tax benefits would ac-
complish "true" compensation and greater deterrence, two goals of
the securities laws.
5. Windfall Profits.-The final form of relief, closely related to
rescission and restitution, is windfall profits. Under the windfall
profits measure of recovery, a defrauded seller recovers the profits
made by a defendant on a resale of the securities fraudulently ob-
tained from the plaintiff. Resting on an unjust enrichment theory,
the seminal case in this area isJanigan v. Taylor.127
In Janigan the plaintiffs sold their stock to their corporation's
president for roughly $40,000. Later, the president sold the stock
for $700,000. In fashioning an award, the court upheld the plain-
tiffs' recovery of the defendant's net profit on the resale.'1 8 The
court noted that "[i]t is more appropriate to give the defrauded
party the benefit even of windfalls than to let the fraudulent party
keep them."'' 29 By awarding the plaintiffs the defendant's gains, the
court achieved two goals of the securities laws, compensation and
126. Id. at 3158-59.
127. 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).




deterrence.13 0 Furthermore, the Janigan court noted that the de-
fendant would not have to return any profits that were directly at-
tributable to his own personal efforts.' 3 '
Another case illustrates the difficulty encountered by a defend-
ant seeking to establish that personal efforts increased the profits.
In Rochez Brothers v. Rhoades ' 2 Rhoades purchased Rochez stock and
later sold the company for a large gain. Although the court noted
Rochez' business timidity and his depreciating effect on the com-
pany, the Third Circuit still denied the entrepreneurial Rhoades any
reduction under the Janigan exception.133
The windfall profits measure as expressed in Janigan received
additional modification in SEC v. MacDonald.'34 In MacDonald the
defendant, chairman of a faltering investment trust, bought stock in
the trust because he knew the trust was about to enter into a
favorable lease.' 35 Suit was brought under rule lOb-5, and the trial
court required the defendant to disgorge the profits that he realized
on the resale of the stock."3 6 The First Circuit reversed the lower
court's measure of restitution. The appellate court held that the de-
fendant must disgorge an amount representing the increased value
of the shares at a reasonable time after public dissemination of the
information.' 31 In addition, the court found that no conduct by the
defendant led to an increase in the value of the shares; conse-
quently, the defendant failed to qualify for theJanigan exception.1
3 8
The focus by the MacDonald court on the causal link between
the plaintiff's injuries and the defendant's misrepresentation effec-
tively limits the total disgorgement measure established injanigan.
The MacDonald limitation reflects a recurring concern of courts in
this area. In formulating damages, the courts have attempted to
prevent plaintiffs from speculating on the market by waiting to sue
and allowing damages possibly to increase. The MacDonald decision
"caps" the disgorgement measure of recovery by allowing a plaintiff
to recover only the appreciation in the value of the stock up to a
130. See Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1339 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970
(1978) (allowing defendant to profit would undermine the deterrent effect of the 1934
Act).
131. 344 F.2d at 787.
132. 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1973).
133. Id.
134. 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983).
135. Id. at 48.
136. Id.




fixed point in time. The MacDonald measure, as a result, avoids im-
posing exorbitant damage awards by shifting the risk of a market
change to the defendant for only a reasonable period. The risk of
any subsequent change in the market then shifts back to the plaintiff.
III. ANALYSIS
Having outlined the operation of these measures, the merits of
their application to several situations will now be considered
through the use of two hypotheticals. The first hypothetical applies
those measures of damages generally available to a defrauded buyer:
an out-of-pocket measure; a benefit-of-the bargain measure; the
Chasins measure; a rescissory measure; a specific restitution mea-
sure; and a windfall profits measure. The second hypothetical con-
siders those measures of damages generally available to a defrauded
seller: an out-of-pocket measure; a benefit-of-the-bargain measure; a
cover measure; a rescissional measure; a specific restitution mea-
sure; and a windfall profits measure. In any given case all of these
measures may not be available. Further, as consequential damages
involve relatively separate concerns, they are not included in these
examples.
1. Recovery By A Defrauded Buyer.-With respect to a defrauded
buyer, consider the following facts: The defendant misrepresented
to the buyer that Corporation X's stock was worth $200 per share.
This led the buyer to purchase X stock for consideration worth $150
when in reality the stock was worth only $100 per share on the date
of the fraudulent transaction. Within a reasonable time thereafter
the X stock declined in value to $50 per share.
Under the out-of-pocket measure, the defrauded buyer would
recover $50 ($150 minus $100) per share. This figure represents
the consideration paid minus the actual value of the security on the
date of the transaction. The date of the transaction should act as the
reference point unless the market is so pervaded by fraud that the
value on this date is inaccurate. In addition, these figures represent
the market value of the shares. If the plaintiff purchased stock of a
closely held corporation, a different valuation technique should be
used.
With the benefit-of-the bargain measure, the plaintiff would re-
cover $100 ($200 minus $100) per share. This measure focuses not
on what the buyer actually paid but on what the buyer would have
received had the stock been worth its represented value. Generally,
federal courts have rejected this measure except in special situations
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such as tender offers, in which this measure overcomes the judicial
hurdles outlined previously.
Looking to the Chasins measure, the buyer would recover $100
($150 minus $50) per share, reflecting the difference between the
consideration paid and the lowest value that the stock reached
within a reasonable time. Use of this measure under these facts thus
results in a greater recovery than under the out-of-pocket measure.
While this may not always be the case,' 9 this situation reveals that
the Chasins measure may hold some advantages for the plaintiff in
certain situations. Resort to the Chasins measure would prove ad-
vantageous when this measure in fact exceeds the out-of-pocket
measure; when the fair value of the stock cannot be determined,
thereby precluding use of the out-of-pocket measure; and when the
fraud, while not going directly to the price nevertheless led to a de-
cline in the stock value, and the buyer could not establish out-of-
pocket damages on the date of the transaction.
Under a rescissory measure, an additional fact should be added.
For the purpose of this example, assume that the buyer resold the X
stock for $75 and therefore could not tender the shares and accom-
plish specific restitution. This measure awards the buyer $75 ($150
minus $75) per share, as the defendant returns the $150 and the
buyer returns the amount reaped from the stock. Because of the
potential for a buyer to speculate by waiting until the value of the X
stock declined further, courts resort to principles related to due dili-
gence and mitigation of damages and require a plaintiff to sue
promptly.
In a suit for specific restitution, a buyer still owning the X
shares would tender the shares and the defendant would return the
$150 consideration. Recovery under this rule requires the prior
existence of a contract between the parties. This remedy, therefore,
may not be available in every situation. Further, the buyer would
only want to pursue this measure if the value of what was given up in
the transaction exceeded the value of what was received.
Finally, a recovery of windfall profits does not arise under these
facts as the defendant derives no excess profit from the transaction.
These facts reflect a limitation in the application of this measure.
When the defendant reaps no profits from the transaction, the buyer
must resort to some other measure. In addition, if the defendant
139. Out-of-pocket damages would exceed the Chasins measure if the lowest value of
the stock within a reasonable time after the transaction does not descend below the
actual value of the stock on the date of the fraudulent transaction.
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realized profits, the buyer's recovery would be limited by the cap
established in MacDonald.
2. Recovery by a Defrauded Seller.-To consider the measures of
damages available to a defrauded seller, assume the following facts:
The defendant's misrepresentations lead the seller to sell the stock
in X Corporation for $100 when the actual value was $150. The
defendant's false statement referred to the value of X stock at $75
per share. Within a reasonable time after the transaction, the X
stock reached a value of $175. The defendant later realized a profit
of $100 per share when the stock was sold for $200 per share.
Under these facts, the defrauded seller would recover $50
($150 minus $100) per share with the out-of-pocket measure. This
measure awards the plaintiff the difference between the amount re-
alized on the sale of the X stock and the value of the stock on the
date of the transaction.
The benefit-of-the-bargain measure would award plaintiff $75
($150 minus $75) per share in an attempt to give the plaintiff what
the plaintiff might have received had the sale not been fraudulent.
The availability of this measure is somewhat limited, however, for in
tender offers the plaintiff might not be able to recover this generous
measure of damages.
The defrauded seller would recover $75 ($175 minus $100) per
share under the cover measure. The cover measure focuses on the
value that the stock reached in a reasonable time after the transac-
tion and in effect awards the plaintiff the amount it would have taken
to reenter the market and repurchase X stock. The cover measure is
available only to a defrauded seller. A defrauded buyer, therefore,
must resort to the Chasins measure to match the limits of this mea-
sure of damages.
If the defendant had disposed of the stock, a rescissory measure
of damages would be available to the defrauded seller. Assume that
at the time the defendant must tender the value of the disposed
shares their value is $210 per share. In accord with this remedy, the
plaintiff recovers $110 ($210 minus $100) per share as each party
tenders the value received from the transaction. Of course, the
plaintiff will only desire to pursue this measure when the value of
the stock appreciates above the value the plaintiff received for the
stock.
Under a specific restitution recovery, the plaintiff will tender
the $100 consideration and the defendant will tender the X shares.
One obvious benefit to this measure is that there are no real valua-
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tion problems since each party returns that which was received. The
plaintiff may not wish to seek this remedy when the stock's value has
declined. Further, if the defendant has sold the shares, specific res-
titution may not be available and the plaintiff must look to some
other damage formulation.
Finally, under a windfall profits measure of damages, the plain-
tiff would recover $100 ($200 minus $100) per share, to reflect the
profits that the defendant realized on the subsequent sale. If this
transaction occurred in a public market, the MacDonald limitation
would allow the plaintiff to recover the defendant's profits only up
to an amount representing the increased value of the shares at a
reasonable time after the public discovers the fraud. °4 0 Conse-
quently, if the X stock did not appreciate greatly in value within a
reasonable time after the transaction, the plaintiff may want to pur-
sue recovery under a measure of damages that would yield a larger
recovery.
IV. CONCLUSION
The objective of this comment has been to illustrate some of
the difficulties and complexities that courts encounter in formulat-
ing damage awards under rule lOb-5. As is probably inherent in
dealing with the issues raised in this area, a great deal of confusion
exists. Courts will continue to struggle with these concepts, and
they must strive to make clear the bases of their decisions in order
to guide practitioners. No uniform measure exists, nor should
courts attempt to create one. Instead, courts must continue to bal-
ance the desire to compensate the plaintiff against the risk of impos-
ing severe hardship on the defendant. In using the measures
discussed, courts ultimately must apply them to promote fairness.
RONALD B. LEE
140. The MacDonald limitation concerns a public market situation and not a private
transaction.
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